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To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the OAS
(Not the Commission)
by Santiago A. Canton*

O

Introduction

a wide range of issues, this article
specifically emphasizes the role they
played in advancing democracy and
strengthening the rule of law, as these
two aspects are central in the current
reform process. In addition, these
two aspects are particularly important, considering that many States
and the OAS Secretary General have
maintained that the strengthening of
democracy and the rule of law is not
a mandate of the Commission and
that any work in that regard should
be limited to the States and the
General Secretariat.

nce again, the 34 active
Member States of the
Organization of American
States (OAS) have engaged in a process to reform the Inter-American
System for Human Rights (IASHR,
the System), particularly the InterAmerican Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR, the Commission).
And, once again, the process is likely
to end with minor, symbolic changes,
mainly oriented toward pleasing the
Member States. However, there are
actual substantive changes needed
to strengthen the System — reforms
that the Commission and the Inter- Juan Manuel Herrera/OAS
American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR, the Court) have presented to the OAS for more than
a decade, reforms requested by civil society and the victims of
human rights violations who rely on the System as a last resort
for justice, and reforms that will likely, once again, be ignored.

Part II takes a look at the reforms
needed to strengthen the System.
I have not focused on the current
debate to reform the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, as
I believe that a more comprehensive approach is needed and that
the strengthening of the IASHR goes through a different path
than just another round of lip service to the Rules. Any comprehensive reform agenda must include a change of the OAS.
A substantive reform of the OAS would not only significantly
resolve most of the challenges of the System, but it would also
help to redefine the role of an organization that, with the exception of its work on human rights, has become outdated in a fast
changing region that is turning its back on this once relevant
regional organization.

This article is divided into two parts. Part I evaluates the
impact of the System on the Member States of the OAS. Any
strengthening process must start with an evaluation of the results
arising from the work of the Commission and Court as well
as their impact on both Member States and individuals. Only
after that exercise is done is it possible to determine the needs
for a reform that effectively strengthens the System. Though
the impact of the Commission and the Court can be seen on

Part I: Impact of the Inter-American System
for Human Rights
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The Inter-American Commission’s Role in the
Promotion of Democracy and the Rule of Law
through Visits and Reports.
Any serious attempt to strengthen the System must first take
into consideration the extraordinary results of the System, which
is arguably the most efficient of all the international mechanisms
for the protection of human rights.
Few would disagree that the work of the IACHR during the
1970s was critical in denouncing the massive human rights violations committed by brutal dictatorships and during the 1980s
and 1990s was crucial in supporting the return of democracy.
The Commission’s work, including its country visits, requests
for information, and reports on various human rights situations,
5
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helped reduce the number of violations and alerted the international community to grave human rights violations.

decisions, both the Commission and the Court have enriched the
legal foundations of the initial decisions and helped to initiate
a process that is resulting in the prosecution and sentencing of
the individuals responsible for the destruction of the democratic
system, together with the killings, torture, and disappearance of
thousands of people.

The Commission’s 1979 country visit to Argentina was
a pivotal point in the history of the System; its work helped
strengthen and define the role of the Commission in preventing
violations and advancing the rule of law in Latin America. As
Jorge E. Taiana, a former Executive Secretary of the IACHR
and Foreign Minister of Argentina, said, “[W]e were confident
that the visit of the Commission would curb the abductions and
weaken the genocidal dictatorship; that from then on, it would
be less likely that prisoners would be dragged from their cells
and shot[.]”1

Integration of Women into Governance
Active and equal participation of women in politics is essential
for the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in countries across the region and the world. On December 28, 2000,
the government of Argentina and the IACHR signed a landmark
friendly settlement to ensure that women compose at least thirty
percent of Argentina’s Congress.4 Although this percentage
is not ideal, it was a remarkable step toward full equality and
participation. The friendly settlement that reformed Argentina’s
electoral code also stipulated sanctions for non-compliance with
the law.

Thirty years later, in June 2009, after the coup d’état
in Honduras, the work of the Commission remained equally
relevant.2 Immediately after the coup, the Commission issued
a press release condemning the coup and it conducted a country visit that allowed it to inform the international community
of the human rights violations being carried out by the police
and military. Promptly following the coup, the IACHR granted
precautionary measures, which are emergency interim directives designed to protect victims. These precautionary measures
called on the Honduran government to protect the life and personal integrity of more than 500 people, curbing the threat of
further human rights violations in the country. The role of the
Commission in denouncing human rights violations by military
dictatorships is as relevant today as it was three decades ago.

Military Justice
With a track record of serious human rights violations, many
armed forces in Latin America have managed to enjoy impunity
by guaranteeing that any prosecution against them be conducted
under a military justice system, therefore ensuring a judgment
by their peers and leniency resulting from the irregular legal procedure. In contrast, the Commission and Court have consistently
held that military courts are not the appropriate procedure for
prosecution of human rights violations.

From the 1979 report on Argentina to the most recent report
on Honduras, the Commission’s visits and country reports have
offered much needed independent evaluations of the state of
human rights in the countries of the region. In addition, the
reports’ findings have empowered civil society organizations
throughout the region by providing them international support
for the issues they champion.

Through a friendly settlement with the Commission in
November 2007, Argentina repealed its military code and
adopted a civilian court procedure for crimes committed by military officers.5 In another groundbreaking decision, the Mexican
National Supreme Court of Justice decided to restrict the competence of military tribunals in cases where army personnel are
accused of human rights violations, based on the IACtHR decision in the case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico.6

Impact of the Individual Petition System
In addition to the political role of the Commission in
strengthening democracy and the rule of law through visits and
reports for the past four decades, its role in advancing the same
goals through the individual petition system is equally, if not
more, important. Several decisions of the Commission have been
instrumental in facilitating institutional changes in countries of
the region, resulting in decisive steps toward the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. Cases decided by the
Commission regarding amnesty laws, women’s participation in
politics, military justice, and freedom of expression are only a
few examples of how the work of the IASHR has transformed
Latin America in ways unthinkable only fifteen years ago.

Freedom of Expression
For more than two decades, the protection of freedom of
expression has been a pillar of the work of the Inter-American
System. Both the Commission and the Court have used all the
tools at their disposal to protect the right to freedom of expression: advisory opinions, individual petition decisions, friendly
settlements, country visits, reports, and the creation of a Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.
The Court’s Advisory Opinion No. 5 laid the groundwork
for the defense of freedom of expression as a key aspect of
a democratic system, holding that freedom of expression is
the cornerstone of a democratic society.7 As a consequence
of the System’s decisions, the Chilean Congress reformed the
country’s Constitution and adopted a freedom of information
law. For decades, the desacato laws have been used across
the region to suppress the criticism of government authorities.
However, in 1992 a friendly settlement included the repeal of
the desacato law from Argentine legislation8 and a report from
the Commission established desacato laws as incompatible with

Amnesty Laws and Impunity for Grave Human Rights
Violations
I believe the most important decisions of the IASHR are three
cases decided in the fall of 1992 against El Salvador, Argentina,
and Uruguay.3 With these three decisions, the Commission
laid the groundwork for the most important legal contribution
in the Americas toward strengthening democracy and fighting impunity in the region and the world: that amnesty laws
are in violation of international human rights law. Since these
6
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the American Convention on Human Rights.9 As a consequence
of that report and the Commission’s follow-up, desacato laws
were also repealed in Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In the
cases of Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica10 and Kimel v. Argentina,11
the Court decided that criminal prosecution for slander and libel,
in cases of public interest, are also used to silence ideas and
opinions. Because of the decision in the Kimel case, Argentina
became the first country in the region to repeal libel and slander
laws from the criminal code in cases of public interest.

changes that are not part of the discussion but are significantly
more relevant — not only because they will strengthen the
human rights system but also because they could help transition
the OAS out of its current state of irrelevance for the region.

Take Concrete Steps to Achieve Universality
Both the Commission and the Court have insisted on the
need to have a universal system. It is unacceptable that fifty
years after the creation of the System many countries have not
yet ratified all the human rights treaties. This is clearly a responsibility of the States, and there is very little that the Commission
and Court can do in this respect.

Guiding Justice Across the Region
In recent decades, judges all over the region have incorporated the jurisprudence of the System in their domestic decisions. In so doing, an Inter-American corpus iuris is rapidly
emerging and strengthening the rule of law with a human rights
perspective. This article has given just a few of the multitude of
examples of constitutional change, approval of new legislation,
repeal of harmful laws, implementation of public policies, and
denunciation of violations that
have resulted from the work of
the System.

If the States are serious about the importance of a universal system, they should take concrete steps. The OAS General
Assembly, in addition to the Resolution passed every year calling for universality, should select a group of foreign ministers
from countries that have ratified all the human rights instruments to travel to the other Member States and promote the
need for universal ratification.
Furthermore, the OAS Secretary
General, besides invoking the
regular rhetoric of universality,
should embark on a continuous
effort with all Member States
to ensure universal ratification. For the last few decades,
universal ratification has never
been a priority for the Secretary
General.

[I]t is possible to argue that the
System has done more for strengthening
democracy, the rule of law, and respect
for human rights in the Americas than
any other inter-governmental institution.

In fact, it is possible to
argue that the System has
done more for strengthening
democracy, the rule of law, and
respect for human rights in the
Americas than any other intergovernmental institution. Yet, if
the Inter-American System has
been so effective in protecting and defending human rights and strengthening democracy
and the rule of law, why such a strong interest by some States
in reforming the System? Unfortunately, the current reform
process does not answer this question and is instead addressing
the same procedural issues that have already been discussed in
past reforms, and likely will result in changes to the Rules of
Procedures and practices of the Commission and Court, all with
the acceptance and approval by most Member States. In all the
previous cases, however, while the Commission and Court proceeded with the reforms of the Rules, the States failed to make
the changes that could have effectively strengthened the System,
including universality, compliance, and a substantive budget
increase. The reform process is walking the same path as before,
and unless more substantive changes are included in the agenda,
the Commission and Court will walk out of this process, unfortunately once again, without any new real strength to protect and
defend human rights.

Integrate Inter-American Jurisprudence with
Internal Legislation and Establish a Special
Rapporteur on Compliance
Despite the important markers of success of the IASHR,
States do not fully comply with a large majority of its decisions.
The challenge of compliance is not unique to the IASHR. In the
international human rights architecture, compliance with the
decisions of the supervisory bodies is always one of the main
challenges.
Considering that compliance is one of the principal raisons
d’être of any human rights system, States should pass internal legislation to ensure compliance with the decisions of the
Commission and Court. In the region, only three countries have
such legislation (Peru, Costa Rica, and Colombia), though none
of these States provides an ideal model to follow.
The OAS political bodies, in consultation with the
Commission and Court, can help the countries of the region by
providing the parameters for a model law of compliance that can
facilitate the passing of national legislation.

Part II: Changes for a Real
Strengthening of the System

In addition, the Commission should appoint a Special
Rapporteur on Compliance. The Rapporteur should not only
get information about the state of compliance but should also
provide support and communicate between the States and the
organs of the System to ensure full compliance with decisions.
The Special Rapporteur should present its findings to a Special

For at least the last twelve years, the Commission has annually presented OAS Member States with what it considers to be
the main challenges of the System: universality, compliance,
and budget increase. While the Commission’s recommendations
have always been given lip service, with the stated endorsement
of most Member States, they have never translated into substantive changes. In addition to those three, I will mention other
7
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Chart 1: Growth of the IACHR Budget and Petitions

Meeting of the Permanent Council, which should be open to the
active participation of victims and their representatives.

Comply with the OAS Charter by Providing the
System with the Budget Required to Accomplish
the Tasks Assigned to It
With a budget of less than USD $5 million, the Commission
is significantly underfunded and unable to fully comply with
all its mandates.12 Although the lack of funding affects the
Commission and Court, it is particularly evident in the individual petition system and the rapporteurships of the Commission.
In 2012, the Commission received approximately 2,000
complaints, an increase of 400% over fifteen years. Since 1997,
the rate of petitions has increased exponentially and continues
to increase between five and twenty percent every year. One of
the main consequences of deficient funding is the delay in the
processing of petitions. During these years, the other mandates
of the Commission have also increased significantly, particularly
due to the creation of new and more active rapporteurships.
Out of the nine special procedures that exist today, only two
existed prior to 1997, and their role was limited to mainly promotional activities. In spite of the increase of petitions and new
mandates, during the same time the OAS’s regular budget for
the Commission increased only marginally. A rough estimate
indicates that if the Commission’s budget had increased in the
Graph 1: Annual
Rates of Growth
Compared
same proportion
as the
rise in the number of petitions received
and rapporteurships created, today the total budget for the
Commission should be around USD $15 million.

IACHR Budget

Petitions Received

1987

$2,854,600

435

1998

$2,569,140

571

1999

$2,997,330

520

2000

$2,968,784

658

2001

$3,111,514

885

2002

$3,140,060

979

2003

$3,197,152

1050

2004

$3,425,520

1319

2005

$2,911,692

1330

2006

$3,254,244

1325

2007

$3,653,888

1456

2008

$3,596,786

1323

2009

$3,825,169

1431

2010

$4,481,722

1598

2011

$4,624,452

1670

2012

$4,767,182

1935

In order to address this problem, the Commission initiated
a campaign to get more funds from both the OAS and external sources. The efforts within the OAS resulted in very small
increases. However, thanks to external funds, the Commission
was able to double its regular budget. A significant percentage of
the external funding came from European countries. The increase
in funding was mainly allocated to the two areas with more need:
the individual petition system and the rapporteurships.

Graph 1: Growth of Petitions Received Relative
to Regular Funds

As a consequence of securing outside funding, in the course
of only three years the Commission was able to reduce the
delay in the processing of cases in the initial review stage from
an average of fifty months to an average of approximately 25
months. Regarding the rapporteurships, in addition to several
more promotional activities, the Commission produced approximately 45 reports during that time, compared with only a couple
during the years before. With this progress amidst only modest
increases in funding, this fact cannot be underestimated: The
vast majority of the challenges faced by the Commission could
be resolved with an adequate budget.
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The drafters of the Convention stated very clearly, without
any possibility of misinterpretation, the importance of the
budget for a well-functioning Commission in Article 40 of
the American Convention by unequivocally expressing that
the Secretariat “be provided with the resources required to
accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Commission.”13 The
Secretary General and Member States have failed to comply
with the responsibilities under Article 40. If the budget is a more
truthful reflection of the will of the States and the Secretary
General, Chart 2 shows the gap between the rhetoric of Member
States and the actual OAS objectives. The budget for 2012,
including external funds, divided by allocation to the main areas,
reveals this stark incongruence:
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Chart 2: 2012 Programmatic Areas Relative
Participation by Fund, in Thousands of US Dollars
(Source: OAS Program Budget of the Organization)
Programmatic
Area

Regular Budget

Specific &
Voluntary Funds

agree that the OAS is outdated and in desperate need of reform.
In the current regional and global order, it is difficult to imagine how the OAS could have a leading role in the hemispheric
architecture unless it undergoes significant change. Regrettably,
in recent years it seems the Secretary General and some States
sadly prefer oblivion to change. The risk of this option is that
the fall of the OAS would also take down the few things that are
working well, like the human rights system.

Total

Democracy &
Governance

7,194.5

18,017.5

25,212.0

Integral
Development

17,396.1

20,782.7

38,178.8

Multidimensional
Security

5,375.4

20,656.0

26,031.3

Policy Direction

6,631.6

1,852.5

8,484.1

Support for the
Member States

17,146.2

1,893.3

19,039.5

Human Rights

6,940.7

3,600.4

10,541.1

Administration

12,467.2

4,745.2

17,212.4

Infrastructure &
Common Cost

12,199.1

1,388.7

13,587.9

TOTAL

85,350.8

72,936.4

158,287.1

Most experts agree that the “Jewels of the Crown” within the
OAS are the Commission and Court, apart from a few distinct
projects like election observations. The remaining OAS activities not pertaining to democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law can either be reduced, continued outside the OAS umbrella,
transitioned into self-sustaining entities, or might not be necessary and can be eliminated altogether.
Any reform should strictly concentrate the OAS mandate
to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In so doing,
the reform needs to be clear that many of the mandates of the
Commission, as mentioned in the first part of this article, are
directly related to the strengthening of democracy and the rule
of law. Therefore it follows that some activities that today fall
under the Secretary General of the OAS could be streamlined
and carried out more effectively by the Commission.

Over the years, the Commission has presented different
options to the OAS for increasing the budget of the System.
During the reform process in the late 1990s, the CommissionGraph 2: 2012 Program-Budget by Programmatic Areas, All Funds
requested a five-year gradual budget increase in order to reach a
total of ten percent of the overall OAS budget. This proposal was
Graph 2: 2012 Program-Budget
accepted as part of the negotiations during the reform process;
Areas, All Funds
however, the Member States never followed through with the
agreed upon budget increases.
Policy Direction
5%

In 2007, the Permanent Council approved a proposal presented by Colombia to create a Voluntary Trust Fund for the
IASHR, the Oliver Jackman Voluntary Capital Fund.14 The
goal of the fund was to establish a source of money for voluntary contributions to finance the operations of the Court and
Commission with income produced by capital contributions.15

Infrastructure
9%

by

Programmatic

Democracy &
Governance
16%
Human Rights
7%

Administration
11%

The Fund was modeled after the Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ), where in order to avoid governmental attempts to influence judgments “favorable to this or that” country, they created
an independent Trust Fund of USD $100 million.16 This model
was presented to the Secretary General in 2008 so he could
engage in a conversation with the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB). However, as of December 2012, the Oliver
Jackman Fund still has little more than the initial contribution
from Colombia, totaling USD $152,000.17

Support to Member
States
12%

Integral Development
24%

Multidimensional

Graph 3: 2012 COE
Program Budget by Programmatic Areas
Security

16%

Graph 3: 2012 COE Program Budget
by Programmatic Areas

Ultimately, the solution to the Commission and Court budget challenges rests in a more profound change discussed at the
OAS for at least two decades: the reform of the OAS itself. A
profound change of the OAS structure would not only help to
address the problems of the human rights system budget but
more importantly would facilitate the design of a more efficient
OAS with an emphasis on its most valuable areas of influence:
democracy and human rights.

Governing Bodies
32%

Human Rights
36%

OAS Reform with a Human Rights and Democratic
Perspective
Latin American experts, diplomats, politicians, members of
academia, and civil society from all over the Americas tend to

Democracy
24%

9

Rule of Law
8%
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The work of the IDB, together with the CAF and the CDB,
makes it unnecessary for the OAS to continue its work on development, particularly at the expense of democracy and human
rights. Although there are differences in development work
among these institutions, in the context of a new OAS, the current programs that are unique to the OAS could be incorporated
into the other institutions.

The first step in the OAS reform process should come with
a budget that more clearly reflects the organization’s priorities. The counterpart to the OAS in the European system is the
Council of Europe (COE). The COE has 47 Members States for
a total of 800 million people and priorities similar to those of
the OAS — its primary aim is to ensure respect for its fundamental values: human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.18
Similarly, the OAS’s four main pillars are democracy, human
rights, security, and development.19

The streamlining of the OAS by narrowing its mandates
to human rights, democracy and the rule of law should
represent a correlating significant increase to the budgets of
the Commission and Court.

With the exception of development, the goals of the two bodies are essentially the same. The OAS’s pillar of multi-dimensional security is covered under the rule of law priority of the
COE in programs related to organized crime, money laundering,
terrorism, cybercrime, and trafficking in human beings. While
the priorities are very similar, a look at the two budgets shows
the gap between the rhetoric and the practice in both organizations. The COE allocates about 36% to human rights20 and the
OAS allocates seven percent.21

Creation of New Structures
The restructuring of the OAS should also advance the creation
of new structures that could address some of the issues that
today’s OAS ignores but are necessary for an OAS more receptive
to the region’s new challenges.

The mandates of the COE and the OAS do diverge with
regard to the work on development. The OAS mandate on development is included in the OAS Charter and represents the largest
percentage of the OAS budget in program-related activities. In
2012 development represented 24% of the OAS budget.22 No
significant change of the OAS budget, and therefore of the budgets of the Commission and Court, will occur without a serious
discussion about development.

Establish a Venice Commission for the Americas
One criticism from Member States is that the Commission
does not entirely fulfill its advisory role in relation to governments. From a strictly formal analysis, this criticism is baseless.
Over the last thirteen years, only Colombia has requested advice
under Article 41(e) of the American Convention. And in that
case, the Commission responded immediately. The Commission
also responded in a few other instances when a request was formally presented, although not through the provision of Article
41(e), as was the case with the request of Peru in the situation
regarding the appropriate tribunal for the trial of Montesinos and
the right to due process.

The OAS Member States should review the role of the OAS
in development and let the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), together with the Comisión Andina de Fomento (CAF)
and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), take the lead on
development in the region.

The Commission is far from being able to respond to all
requests by Member States for advice and support on issues such
as legislative reforms, public policies, and electoral disputes.
Budget constraints, as well as the possibility of a conflict of interest
should its advice ever come into play in an individual petition
brought before the Commission, seriously limit the ability
of the Commission to respond in many of the cases.

Article 1 of the OAS agreement establishing the IDB states
in its first line that “[t]he purpose of the Bank shall be to
contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the member countries, individually and collectively.”23 One
obstacle to fully incorporating all of the OAS development activity
within the IDB is the fact that not all Caribbean Member States of
the OAS are members of the IDB. This potential obstacle to strictly
limiting the mandate of the OAS to human rights and democracy
should be addressed by both institutions in order to guarantee full
access of all Caribbean states to the benefits of the IDB.

The European Commission for Democracy through Law,
better known as the Venice Commission, is an excellent
model to consider in the Americas.27 It is an advisory body on
constitutional matters composed of independent experts. The
OAS should establish such an independent body composed
of independent experts who could respond to the requests the
Commission receives. There should be formal channels of communication between the new advisory body and the IACHR in
order to ensure the incorporation of a human rights perspective
in any advice given by such a body.

The CAF today includes sixteen countries from Latin
America and the Caribbean24 and its goal is to “promote sustainable development and regional integration through efficient
resource mobilization for the timely delivery of multiple, high
added value financial services to public and private clients in our
shareholder countries.”25
The CDB includes eighteen countries from the Caribbean26
and operates under the goal of being the leading catalyst for
development efforts within the region by working with CDB
members and other development partners toward the systematic reduction of poverty in their countries through social and
economic development.

Permanent Commissioners and Judges
It is no longer possible to continue with the model designed
in 1959 of temporary members ad honorem serving as
Commissioners and Judges. With the ever-increasing number of
petitions, it is necessary to have a Commission and Court staffed
with permanent, professional members. Although some positive
steps have been taken in this direction, the technically parttime Commissioners and Judges continue to receive inadequate

With an annual budget of approximately USD $38 million,
the OAS’s impact in development, in comparison with over USD
$10 billion in development funds among the three main regional
institutions, is clearly insignificant.
10
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honorariums and spend an inordinate amount of time working
for the Commission and Court.

of the opposition are strongly silenced by Member States. Few
things will strengthen the democratic systems and the respect
for human rights throughout the Americas more than the possibility for opposition leaders to, at the very least, be provided
an opportunity to express their views within the OAS. The history of Latin America would be dramatically different today if
throughout the 1970s opposition leaders had the opportunity to
express their views on the atrocities taking place at that time.
Countless deaths may have been prevented.

Additional Special Rapporteurships Following the
Freedom of Expression Model
The rapporteurships of the Commission28 play an integral role
in highlighting issues that deserve special attention by the international community. Originally, the work of the rapporteurships was
mainly promotional and until 1998 all rapporteurships were carried out by a Commissioner. In 1998 the Commission created the
Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression as a permanent office with one person selected by the Commission working
full-time and with a mandate expanded beyond just promotional
activities. In addition, in 2001 the Executive Secretary created the
Unit of Human Rights Defenders, which since 2008 has been led
by a Commissioner and in 2012 became a rapporteurship. Also in
2011, the Commission created the Unit on the Rights of Lesbian,
Gay, Trans, Bisexual, and Intersex
Persons (LGTBI), which is also led by
a Commissioner.
Today, as a consequence of these
developments, the Commission
has seven rapporteurships, one
special rapporteur, and one unit.
Commissioners fulfill all roles except
that of the Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression. Based on the evolution of
the System and the experience of the
UN special procedure system, it is very
likely the Commission will create additional rapporteurships. It goes against
any rationale to limit the amount of
rapporteurships to the amount of
Commissioners, as if there will never
be more than seven important issues.

The argument that today because all Member States are
democracies there is consequently no need for the opposition to
express its views is one that does not even pass an elementary
test on democracy and freedom of expression. The European
System benefits from the European Parliament, which allows for
a range of voices from Member States to express their views. If
the OAS wants to be a beacon of democracy and human rights
in the Americas, it must reform itself to allow other voices to
participate in the political debate.

The first step in the OAS
reform process should come with
a budget that more clearly reflects
the organization’s priorities. If
the OAS wants to be a beacon
of democracy and human rights
in the Americas, it must reform
itself to allow other voices to
participate in the political debate.

In addition, the OAS should have
a systematic approach to allow civil
society to participate in the discussions. Although civil society enjoys
more opportunities than opposition
leaders, non-governmental organizations’ participation is still subject to
a case-by-case determination without
a clear and transparent procedure for
regular participation.

General Assembly

The regular General Assembly of
the OAS has lost its significance.
Only Extraordinary Assemblies have,
on occasion, some relevance, such as
when they are called to address an
issue that affects democracy and human rights. Most of the work
during the regular General Assembly session is either completely
unnecessary or could easily be handled by the Permanent Council.

With the increasing number of petitions and country visits, it
will become very difficult for the Commissioners to be able to
dedicate the time needed to ensure that the mandates of the rapporteurships and units receive the special attention and expertise
required, even if they are employed full-time.

However, if the OAS can modify its mandates to concentrate primarily on human rights and democracy, the General
Assembly could become relevant once again by spending the
time and energy to discuss the work of the OAS in these two
fields. Today, the combined time given to the Commission and
the Court during the General Assemblies is no more than fifteen
minutes. Most of the time, there is absolutely no discussion of
the activities carried out during the year by these two bodies.
In the last fifteen years, the only discussions about the System
took place in El Salvador in 2011 and Bolivia in 2012, and those
instances were both to discuss the reform process, not necessarily to discuss strengthening the System.

The Commissioners are selected for their “recognized competence in the field of human rights”29 and not necessarily for
their special expertise on any particular human rights issue. The
work of the rapporteurships has also expanded from the original
promotional activities to a more active mandate; in many cases,
the knowledge and experience of the Commissioners might not
be sufficient to carry out the expanded responsibilities.
A stronger IASHR should contemplate more special rapporteurships following the model of the Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression, which is the best way to guarantee that these special
mandates will benefit from an expert in the field and that the
issue will get the requisite attention.

A more effective regional system for the protection of human
rights should include a General Assembly that meets every year
to discuss the reports of the Commission and Court. After the
presentations of the Presidents of the two bodies, the Special
Rapporteur on Compliance should inform the Member States
of the status of compliance and provide recommendations for
follow up.

Freedom of Expression for all Sectors
The OAS is very outdated when it comes to welcoming the
voices of the political opposition to governments. The voices
11
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Conclusion

The extraordinary achievements of the Commission and
Court in defending and protecting human rights and the rule of
law in the Americas have increased the demands from individuals and civil society organizations throughout the Americas for
an even more active System. The Commission and Court are not
able to respond in full to the new demands, mainly because the
OAS General Secretariat and some Member States have not followed up with the promises made to increase the budget of the
Commission and Court.

For at least the last fifteen years, the Commission and Court
have regularly expressed to the Member States of the OAS the
need to strengthen the System through significant increases in
the budget, the ratification by all States of the human rights
treaties, and increased compliance with the decisions of the
Commission and Court. These requests have consistently been
ignored by most States and the General Secretariat, in spite
of the constant expressions of support by presidents, foreign
ministries, ambassadors, secretaries general, and civil society
organizations.

A serious strengthening of the System should take into
consideration the new hemispheric reality of an OAS that is no
longer the relevant political forum of decades ago. The strengthening of the System should therefore start by acknowledging
this reality and by reforming the OAS to focus its work on
democracy and human rights. A reform based on that ground
will not only strengthen the human rights protection for millions of people all over the Americas, but it will also result in a
reinvigorated OAS.

All the recent attempts initiated by Member States to
strengthen the System have, on the contrary, been characterized
by requests for reforms oriented toward changes that will mainly
limit the Commission’s ability to defend and protect millions of
people in the Americas from human rights violations committed
by the States.
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